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INTRODUCTION 
The value of plant variety protection in developing 
countries has been questioned recently by several studies. A 
World Bank financed study of six developing countries . 
including China - could find no empirical evidence that plant 
breeders rights would induce new research, new varieties, or 
strengthen developing country seed industries (Louwars et al 
2005). Another study of plant breeder’s rights in China (Koo et 
al 2003) argues that because of the high fees required to obtain 
and maintain protection of a variety in China, obtaining PVP 
on plant varieties is not profitable for most crops.   
China passed its plant variety protection act (PVPA) in 
1997 and started accepting applications in 1999 for ten crops. 
It now covers all major crops  although it is too early to 
empirically test the impacts of PVPA  on private companies 
breeding research investment the data set that more than 1100 
applications for new plant variety protection (PVP) were 
submitted to the national plant variety protection office from 
1999 to 2003 presents a unique opportunity to study the 
impact of PVP on the supply and adoption of new plant 
varieties.  It is possible to test whether it is profitable for 
research institutes to obtain PVPs on their best new varieties 
by estimating the impact of PVPs on the price of seed and 
sales of protected varieties. If protected varieties lead to higher 
prices, and enough seed is sold at the higher prices, there is a 
strong possibility that PVPA will induce a considerable 
amount of research.   
 
DATA 
To analyze the impacts of PVPA, we collected data on all 
the rice varieties sown on more than 6667 hectares that 
farmers grow in Guangdong, Hunan, and Zhejiang provinces 
during 1999-2002.  The information included the varieties’ 
sown area, seed prices, and varieties’ characteristics by year 
and by province. The sown area data came from the Ministry 
of Agriculture (MOA). The seed prices came from authors’ 
survey. 
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The varieties’ characteristics data came from the varieties 
regional tests. The information include varieties’ yield potential, 
grain quality (normal quality, high quality, and supper quality), 
growing season (early, middle and late season rice), rice type 
(indica and japonica), variety type (conventional variety and 
hybrid variety)  and  the variety’s source (public sector and 
private sector). The public sector included national level 
research institutes, provincial level rice research institutes, 
prefecture level research institutes, and universities. The private 
sector included seed companies and individuals. Besides those, 
we also collected the information whether  the variety  was 
protected with PVP, for which came from PVP office of MOA.   
Table 1 shows the differences between protected and 
un-protected varieties’ seed prices and sown area. It shows that 
the seed prices of protected varieties were higher than the 
non-protected varieties as expected. The average price of PVP 
varieties was 12.6 Yuan/kg - 4.8 Yuan/kg higher than that of the 
non-PVP varieties. The large share of protected varieties that 
are hybrids, accounts for much of the difference between the 
PVP and non PVP prices. The price of a PVP conventional 
variety is only 0.6 Yuan/kg higher than that of a non-PVP 
variety and the price of PVP hybrids is only 1.7 Y uan/kg higher 
than that of non-PVP hybrids on average. However, hybrids sell 
for 7 or 8 Yuan/kg more than conventional varieties. The last 
row of Table 1 shows that the PVP varieties are grown on a 
smaller average area than the non-PVP varieties. The average 
sown area of PVP varieties is 27 thousand hectares - 5% less 
than that of non-PVP varieties. 
 
Table 1. The seed price and planted area of the PVP and 
Non-PVP varieties 
  PVP varieties  Non-PVP varieties 
Seed prices (yuan/kg) 
Conventional variety  5.1 (7)  4.5 (311) 
Hybrid variety  13.1 (92)  11.4 (293) 
Average  12.6 (99)  7.8 (604) 
Area planted (1000 ha) 
Conventional variety  25.1 (7)  25.9 (311) 
Hybrid variety  27.1 (92)  31.1 (293) 
Average  27.0 (99)  28.4 (604) 
Note: The number in the parentheses is the observations. 
Source: Author survey from Guangdong, Hunan and Zhejiang provinces. 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
The impact of PVPA on seed price and farmers’ variety 
adoption could be due to a number of factors. A model of seed 
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pricing and variety’s sown area can be expressed as follows:  
Pseedit=g(Xi, Seedpolicyt, PVPi, Institutioni, Regioni)  (1) 
Areait=g(Xi, Pseedit, PVPi, Poutpriceit,Ageit Institutioni, 
Regioni)  (2) 
where  Pseedit is the price of ith  variety  in  tth  year. 
Seedpolicyt is the seed policy in  tth  year.  Areait is the sown 
area of ith variety in tth year.  Poutpriceit is  ith variety’s outp ut 
(grain) price in tth year. Ageit controls for the fact that varieties 
that have been in the field longer have spread further.  
Institution controls for the type of institution that is selling the 
variety (different types of  government research institutions 
plus private firms) and finally we have included a regional 
dummy to control for missing variables that are associated 
with the province in which the variety was applied for and 
which location the variety was sown. 
A three stage estimation for systems of simultaneous 
equations was adopted. To estimate the system, we introduced 
a seed policy variable as the instrumental variable (IV) in the 
price function. The variable is created based on the new seed 
law was decreed and implemented in 2000. At the same time, 
we hypothesize that a number of control variables (varieties’ 
morphological characteristics and three province dummy 
variables) can be included in both the price and sown area 
functions. In addition, we also posit that the variety’s price and 
sown area were determined by the breeders’ commercial and 
extension capability. The variety’s source is used to measure 
the differences in the capability of different breeders. As in the 
PVP function estimation, all institutional sources are given a 
value of one while seed companies are the check and is not 
included.   
 
RESULTS 
Seed price model 
Our PVP impact analysis shows the effects on seed price 
(table 2, column 1).The positive and significant coefficient of 
the PVP variable indicates that PVP increased seed price 
significantly. Ceteris paribus, PVP varieties increase seed price 
by 0.84 Yuan/kg over non-PVP varieties. The coefficient of a 
variety’s yield potential is not significant but the coefficient of 
super grain quality variety is highly significant and higher 
value. Compared to early rice, middle and late season rice 
varieties had higher seed prices. The insignificance of yield 
and significance of quality variables indicates that during 
1999-2002 firms thought farmers were willing to pay more for 
high grain quality than yield. Another possible explanation for 
the insignificance of yield is that the other variety 
characteristics such as hybrids and season which are important 
determinants of yield are picking up much of the yield impact.   
Hybrid varieties seed price was 7.03 Yuan/kg higher than 
that of conventional rice varieties. The size of this price 
premium over conventional unprotected varieties and hybrids 
indicates why more than 70 percent of the rice PVPs were on 
hybrids or inbred lines used to make hybrids rather than 
conventional varieties (Huang et al 2005). Indica varieties’ seed 
price is 1.91 Yuan/kg higher than that of japonica.   
Variety sown area model 
PVPA also impacts the area sown to a variety. PVP appears 
to have a negative impact on area planted. Table 2 reports two 
specifications of our Area model. The first assumed that PVPs 
affect area sown primarily through the price variable. The 
second specification hypothesized that PVP works both through 
prices and directly – either because the suppliers put supply 
constraints on the seed of protected varieties or farmers have a 
preference for varieties without PVPs. In both specifications 
higher seed prices lead to lower levels of use of a variety. This 
is what economic theory would lead us to expect - farmers buy 
less on seed that is more expensive if quality is held constant 
and we have tried to hold all of the other important 
characteristics of the varieties constant.   
 
 Table 2.  Impact of PVP on seed price and sown area by variety 
Variety sown area 
(1000 ha) (Log model)   
Seed price 
(Yuan/kg) 





Time trends  -0.17  0.05  0.05 
Policy variables       
  Seed policy dummy  0.73
*     
  PVP  0.84
***    -0.24
* 
Seed price (Yuan/kg)    -0.54
*  -0.52
* 
Output price (Yuan/kg)    -0.31  -0.23 
Varieties characteristics       
Variety age  -0.13
**  0.04
*  0.04 
Variety age squared  0.01
**  -0.002
*  0.00 
Yield (ton/ha)  -0.001  -0.54  -0.52 
High grain quality  0.33  0.27
*  0.24
* 
















Indica (Japonic=0)  1.91
***  -0.04  -0.05 
Research institutes       
  National    0.74  0.62
***  0.61
*** 




Prefecture    0.01  0.42
***  0.41
*** 




Observations  703    703  703 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Specification 2 shows that there is an additional significant 
negative impact from PVPs holding prices and other 
characteristics constant. The mechanism behind this negative 
impact is not clear. One explanation is that PVP protection   3 
restricted the number of seed companies that can sell the PVP 
varieties’ seeds compared to the non-PVP varieties. Most 
farmers would not know whether the varieties they are 
purchasing are protected by PVP or not. So, we would not 
expect that this is a demand side impact. On the supply side 
companies may not have invested enough in producing 
sufficient supplies of seed early in the adoption process 
because of the uncertainties about the actual quantity that will 
be demanded by farmers and the large losses that a company 
incurs if they produce seed that they can not sell. The 
uncertainty about demand is multiplied by the fact that in the 
first few years firms are selling seed under a temporary 
registration permit which the government can revoke if the 
varieties’ tests turn up any problems with the varieties.   
The evidence from our data on rice varieties suggests that 
PVPA has allowed companies to raise the price of seed to 
farmers even after holding grain quality and yield potential of 
the varieties constant. Most protected varieties are hybrids (92 
out of 99 in Table 1). This strategy of protecting hybrids 
appears to be particularly effective since the protected hybrids 
have a price premium of 7 yuan per kg over unprotected 
varieties. Grain quality of a variety also allows companies to 
increase the price of seed but yield potential, unless that 
characteristic is embodied in the hybrid variable, did not 
increase prices. Provincial government research institutions 
and universities were able to charge more than private 
companies. This is  not surprising given that they private 
companies tend to be small and relative young companies 
which do not have the same prestige and standing of the 
government research institutes.   
The econometric analysis in Table 2 also indicates that 
variety protection working reduces the area planted with a 
variety substantially due both to the fact that it takes seed 
firms a while to ramp up production and also to the uncertainty 
about whether the government will revoke their temporary 
permits to produce the varieties. It also indicates that the 
higher prices will reduce seed used substantially while other 
characteristics such as better quality, hybrids, and the nature of 
the institute that developed the variety substantially increase 
use. Since the protected varieties typically combine higher 
prices with better quality and are hybrids, the true impact of 
PVP on quantity sold is difficult to sort out.   
We find that applying for PVPs on hybrids can be 
profitable. Table 1. shows the average impact of all factors on 
the average area and price of varieties with and without PVPs. 
Using these values the advantage of selling protected versus 
unprotected varieties was calculated in Table 3. Since hybrids 
make up 92 percent of the protected rice varieties in our 
sample, we use the prices and area of hybrids. Area planted 
can be translated into sales by using the seeding rate for hybrids 
which is 15 kg/ha (Koo et al 2003). Table 3 shows that the 
increase in revenue from protecting hybrid varieties is only 
about 7,050 yuan per year. On average new hybrids are replaced 
every five years in these regions of China. This more than the 
cost of obtaining and maintaining PVPs which is 6,400 Yuan 
initially plus 1,500 Yuan for the first three years, 1,950 Yuan for 
the next three (Koo et al 2003). So, protection is probably 
profitable over the lifetime of a hybrid rice variety.  
 
Table 3. Average increase in revenue 
  Mean of Hybrid Prices and Area from 
Table 1 
Unprotected     
Area sown (ha)    31,100 
Seed rate (kg/ha)    15 
Price (yuan/kg)    11.4 
  5,318,100 
Protected     
Area sown (ha)    27,100 
Seed rate (kg/ha)    15 
Price (yuan/kg)    13.1 
  5,325,150 
Increased revenue    7,050 
Souce:Caculated by authors. 
 
This analysis was conducted in the earliest years of the 
Plant Variety Protection Act in China. It suggests that protecting 
rice hybrids may be profitable. It does not suggest that the 
profits so far will provide much incentive for companies to 
invest a lot of money in rice research. However, the fact that 
companies are raising prices for their protected varieties 
suggests hope that they will be able to raise them more in the 
future so that they can support more research. Our analysis also 
suggests the need to revisit this data in the future and to see if 
prices and sales expand. 
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